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We identify typical problems in the interactions of 
people with current software-based systems. In particular 
we observe the need to expend significant on-going effort 
to adapt these systems to reflect changes in the world 
about them, the need for people to adapt their working 
practices to fit in with these systems, and the inflexibility 
of these systems when faced with unusual circumstances 
or the need for change. We believe that these problems 
follow, at least in part, from these systems being 
developed and evolved using mechanisms each based on 
one Inquiry System only. This basis leads to assumptions 
being embedded in the mechanisms’ analysis outputs, and 
in system designs and implementations. We suggest that 
the problems noted may be mitigated by the use of a 
dialectical approach to Inquiry System selection for 
software development, based on the work of Hegel, which 
places in opposition different models of a situation based 
on different Inquiry Systems. We claim that such a 
mechanism has the potential to make explicit some of the 
assumptions which would otherwise be embedded 
implicitly in the delivered system without being 
questioned. We outline a research programme intended to 
test this hypothesis, and suggest other research directions. 
Introduction 
The problems arising from the need for constant 
evolution of software systems (Lehman 1998) and the 
effects of their inflexibility on their users, as encountered 
in everyday life (Chancellor 2000), have previously been 
noted. In response to these issues we propose an 
alternative to the philosophical basis of current software 
development methods. The long-term objective of this 
research is to identify and use tools developed for 
philosophical analysis to inform and improve the practice 
of software development. We set out below an initial 
analysis of the current state of use of Inquiry Systems in 
software development, note its weaknesses, and suggest 
an improved approach. We also describe additional work 
which we believe is required. 
A Variety of Inquiry Systems 
A fundamental element of any mechanism intended to 
analyse a situation, or to hypothesise about how to change 
it, is the way in which information is to be gathered and 
organised; the ‘Inquiry System’. Mitroff (1973) describes 
five types of Inquiry Systems (ISs), differing in their 
philosophical bases. He states that the differences between 
them result in different views of what constitutes 
information, as well as how to obtain it. Thus, a model 
built using one IS will differ from those developed using 
others, in its view of the world and in the nature of the 
elements forming its content.  
Mitroff’s characterisation of the ISs can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Leibnitzian, in which innate ideas (primitive 
variables, analytic truths) are combined into more 
complex arrangements, using logic-based 
mechanisms. A further mechanism determines 
whether or not the process is converging to an 
optimal set. The logical systems which result from 
such an inquiry are claimed to display rigour, logical 
coherence, precision, and unambiguity in the use of 
terms. However, no defence of the selected set of 
terms can be made from within the logical system, 
and this IS, whilst suited to the analysis of sets of 
symbols, is poor at representing experience/empirical 
content; 
• Lockean, inductive and consensual in its basis, 
emphasising sensory data and building up from these 
to its conclusions. The result is a combination of 
human judgement (in contrast to Leibnitz’s logical 
basis) and agreement between people. This IS can 
take as its inputs much richer experiential data than 
Leibnitzian systems. However, the simple 
‘sensations’, ‘facts’ or ‘observables’ which form 
Locke’s starting point have usually proved on 
investigation to be more complex than he has 
suggested, and have thus themselves required further 
investigation. In addition, the effort required to obtain 
the necessary consensus may be considerable; 
• Kantian, which relies on building more than one 
Leibnitzian model, each intended to explain the 
phenomena under investigation, and collecting data 
for each based on the demands of the model. The 
inquirer is thus presented with models of the same 
problem from multiple viewpoints, and is able to 
select one model from those available as his or her 
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 chosen result. However, the creation of too many 
models can overwhelm the recipient, the cost is 
greater due to the necessity to build and collect data 
for multiple models, and there is no guarantee that the 
‘right’ model will be amongst those constructed; 
• Hegelian, based on bringing conflicting models into 
contact and learning from the result. The mechanism 
requires the construction of two antagonistic, strongly 
conflicting Leibnitzian models, embodying 
conflicting sets of assumptions about the problem 
under consideration. These models are then applied to 
the same Lockean data set, with the aim of 
demonstrating that both models can be supported by 
the data, and that the diverging conclusions to be 
drawn differ due to assumptions made in constructing 
the models. These assumptions are thus opened up for 
examination. The decision-maker builds his/her own 
view of the situation, informed by witnessing the 
conflict and examining the assumptions brought to 
light. The advantages of this approach include the 
active involvement of the decision-maker in 
information interpretation and synthesis into the final 
model, and the prevention of assumptions from being 
hidden by agreement amongst all the other 
participants. Therefore it is seen as being particularly 
suitable for investigations into ill-structured 
problems. However, it is less successful in examining 
well-structured problems. A major problem is that of 
selecting opposing Weltanschauungen;1 and 
• the IS proposed by Singer, and extended by 
Churchman, which emphasises a perceived need to 
take an interdisciplinary approach to inquiry, and an 
approach which encompasses scientific, ethical and 
aesthetic viewpoints. The aim is to integrate all of 
these within one frame of reference. As a result, the 
primitive elements of information which are taken as 
given and thus unquestioned by the other ISs 
described, are regarded by a Singerian IS as aspects 
to be opened up and studied. Unlike the other ISs, it 
does not regard its primitives as representations of 
reality, but suggests instead that any description 
becomes become ‘real’ if its proponents can convince 
enough people of its validity. The body of 
information to be considered is no longer purely 
scientific, but incorporates ethical aspects as well. 
This IS gives the most comprehensive modelling of 
the ISs outlined, but problems arise both in making 
ethical content explicit and in the very complex 
model specifications necessitated. 
                                                          
1
  The weltanschauung is the world-view of the 
observer, or, as Checkland has described it, “the 
(unquestioned) image or model of the world” (1990: 
319) 
A Critique of the Current State of Software 
Systems Development 
An examination of the current state of the 
development and use of software systems reveals a 
number of problems. These include the following: 
• the embedding, explicitly or implicitly, of 
assumptions about the system, its environment and 
the world in software products, necessitating 
sometimes difficult ‘evolutionary’ changes or even 
system replacement when these assumptions are 
invalidated by time or change (Lehman 1998; 
Loomes and Jones 1998). The need to evolve 
software systems results in the evolutionary costs of a 
software system exceeding the initial development 
costs, sometimes comprising up to 60%2 of the total 
system lifetime costs. This requirement also means 
that part or all of the system in use at any particular 
time is not well-suited to its environment; 
• a lack of true user involvement in systems 
development, in which the stakeholders are often 
presented with a single option and not allowed to 
make an informed choice between alternatives. For 
example, a prototyping approach to software 
development typically consists of presenting a user 
with one version of a prototype system at a time and 
asking if this is what they want or, if not, what is 
wrong with it. By not allowing stakeholders to 
compare and contrast different prototypes placed 
before them simultaneously, this mechanism fails to 
offer stakeholders a fully informed choice between 
the range of alternatives which the technologies and 
developers’ imaginations can provide. In addition, the 
users can usually only respond within the framework 
offered by the prototype and the mechanisms which 
led to its development; radical criticisms are unlikely 
to arise since the questions leading to them will not 
be posed. This lack of choice may also reduce the 
degree of perceived flexibility in the finished systems, 
as fewer possible models of the problem and/or 
solution are explored by system developers and 
stakeholders. The complexity of the situation within 
which the system will be embedded (and to which it 
will need to be able to respond) is therefore 
potentially underestimated, and the need for users to 
adapt to the system when it is installed is thus 
increased. In effect, people have become the tools of 
‘the system’ rather than vice versa (Chancellor 2000); 
and 
                                                          
2
  Pfleeger (1998) reports surveys suggesting that 80% of 
lifetime system effort is expended on its maintenance, 
and that only 25% of this effort goes into preventive 
and corrective maintenance. 
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 • the lack of recognition of the influence of the 
developers’ mind-sets on software systems being 
developed or evolved. These mind-sets are derived 
both from the developers’ own previous experience 
and from the tools, techniques, languages and 
notations which they employ (Loomes 1990; Wernick 
1996). 
An Alternative to Current Uses of Inquiry 
Systems in Software Development 
In this section, we identify the Inquiry Systems in use 
in current software development methods, and note that 
each method only uses one IS in its information-gathering 
work. We then suggest an alternative to the ways in which 
ISs are used in these methods, and set out the anticipated 
advantages of such an approach. 
The Use of Inquiry Systems in Software 
Development 
On the basis of Mitroff’s interpretations given above, 
we note that the Inquiry Systems underlying current 
software development mechanisms generally appear to be 
either Leibnitzian in style, as is typical of hard systems 
design ‘methodologies’ such as SSADM (Downs et al. 
1992) or Churchman/Singerian, such as Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM: Checkland 1990).  
We also observe that only one IS is used for any one 
stage in the process. At present, when more than one IS is 
employed in a single software development mechanism, 
the current approach is to employ them sequentially. The 
output from one sub-process based on one IS, typically a 
non-Leibnitzian IS, is used as the input to a second, 
usually Leibnitzian, sub-process. Consider, for example, 
Multiview (Avison and Wood-Harper 1993), which uses a 
Churchman-based SSM analysis, followed by a hard 
Leibnitzian methodology. In current practice, the use of 
multiple ISs in combination to address difficult problems 
is thus often reduced to the decision, which is potentially 
difficult to reverse, of when to stop using one IS and start 
using another.  
We suggest that adopting a single IS in examining a 
situation or building a model may result in an incomplete 
understanding of the situation or in the development of a 
limited range of models. This is because paradigmatic 
assumptions (cf. Kuhn 1970) embedded in the IS itself 
will direct and influence the questions which it is 
necessary to ask and the interpretation of the answers 
obtained, and because these assumptions will not be made 
explicit and exposed to questioning. We question whether, 
for example, a purely Leibnitzian approach would capture 
all the nuances of a human-based situation. However, it 
may also be asked whether multiple models based 
exclusively on a Churchman or Singerian IS will capture 
all the aspects needed for the incorporation of a hard 
software-based system in the final human activity system, 
given the current state of such software-based systems and 
their underlying computational models.  
We suggest that the adoption of a Hegel-like 
dialectically-based approach may address this problem 
successfully, thus alleviating some of the issues raised 
above. Checkland has employed a Hegelian approach in 
SSM, placing in opposition different (Churchman-based) 
SSM root definitions to reflect differing viewpoints 
(Checkland 1990: 261). However, we believe that a 
weakness remains in this mechanism, since the IS 
underlying all these root definitions is still the same, and 
any assumptions implicit in that IS are perpetuated in all 
its models. As a result, some of the benefit of a conflict-
based mechanism in identifying assumptions may be lost. 
We do not take it as being immutable that, in adopting 
a Hegelian IS as a framework, we are limited to the use of 
a single IS to build the models to be opposed. We believe 
that situations should be examined, models developed and 
systems designed from multiple viewpoints obtained from 
different ISs. In addition to the potential for exposing 
assumptions in the ISs themselves, the use of more than 
one IS may afford a greater opportunity to make explicit 
the assumptions of the analysts concerned. In any analysis 
task, the analyst is a part of the observation, recording and 
analysis system; a multi-IS approach may provide a 
mechanism for revealing at least partially how this 
inevitability affects the models produced. 
The analogy drawn previously between the 
development of software systems and Feyerabend’s view 
of science (Feyerabend 1993; see Wernick 1998) supports 
the view that we may need to oppose a number of 
different types of model, based on different ISs, to obtain 
the wider range of viewpoints which we desire. The use of 
different ISs here may also assist in provoking the conflict 
needed to bring out the underlying assumptions. 
A Mechanism Extending the Hegelian 
Dialectic 
We now outline an approach intended to place in 
Hegelian opposition before a system’s stakeholders a 
number of models developed using methods based on 
different Inquiry Systems. The presentation of such a set 
of models to stakeholders is intended to allow them see 
the results of taking into account a wider set of 
viewpoints. 
This Hegel-based mechanism comprises: 
• the development of models based on different ISs, 
designed to reflect the current or projected future 
state of the same part of the system and/or the same 
situations – in this, it is unlike current mechanisms, 
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 • the presentation of these models to the intended 
owners, users and other stakeholders of the system, 
and 
• the selection by the stakeholders, informed by 
similarities and differences between the models, of 
one of the models or of a composite model based on 
selected features of more than one model as a basis 
for proceeding. 
We suggest that this approach would improve software 
development processes by: 
• making explicit and bringing to users’ attention at 
least some of the assumptions currently embedded in 
software systems analysis and design development 
tools and people, and thus implicitly embedded in 
software systems; 
• facilitating greater involvement for stakeholders as 
selectors of the solution, allowing them a greater 
degree of choice amongst possible solutions and 
providing them with greater understanding (and 
therefore control) over the criteria by which such 
decisions are to be made; and 
• allowing the development of more flexible systems, 
or at least of systems better able to cope with the 
range of unusual circumstances and rare events found 
in the real world and often missed or ignored by 
analysts. This may be achieved as stakeholders’ views 
of what is possible and necessary in the system are 
informed by the presentation to them of a wider range 
of situations, options and facilities generated by the 
different ISs employed, rather than the limited set of 
options seen from a single standpoint as at present. 
Given the parallel efforts which need to be made in 
each part of the development, it is inevitable that the 
initial development of real-world software systems 
employing this approach would cost more than traditional 
mechanisms, due to the need to model each situation in 
two or more ways. However, the benefit may be seen be in 
terms of a system better able to cope with evolutionary 
pressures over time. As noted above, the latter result in a 
large proportion of system lifetime costs. The additional 
initial investment in a Hegelian development mechanism 
for a long-lived software system may therefore be justified 
by savings later in the life of the system. 
The Nature of ‘Conflict’ in the Hegelian-based 
Inquiry System 
In developing a software development mechanism 
based on the Hegelian dialectic, a crucial question to be 
addressed is that of how to conduct the process of placing 
the different models in conflict in the presence of the 
decision-makers in such a way as to optimise the learning 
process.  
In a scientific exploration, this public conflict could be 
achieved by, for example, devising and conducting an 
experiment intended to falsify one, and only one, of the 
theoretical models under consideration. The result of this 
experiment would show that this one model was (or was 
not) supported by the now-augmented set of observations. 
The order in which such experiments were devised and 
conducted would not affect the results obtained from each 
experiment. 
However, the situation is different in the development 
of software systems. In this case, the order in which 
stakeholders are presented with, for example, different 
prototype systems for examination may affect which 
prototype they prefer, or which features they might take 
from each to produce a combined model, as they learn 
from exposure to successive prototypes more about their 
problem and how to address it. This may even lead to a 
need for different groups of analysts and of stakeholder 
personnel to be involved in developing each model, to 
avoid the clear division between the different ISs from 
being bridged by exposure to other viewpoints. However, 
such an approach would also result in a loss of synergy 
over the entire set of people involved in the development, 
since opportunities would inevitably be lost for members 
of one IS group to learn about the situation from members 
of other groups. 
The purpose of the proposed conflict mechanism in 
software development is also significant in considering 
how such a mechanism should operate. Its currently 
perceived objective is to bring to the surface the 
assumptions embedded in each model and allow multiple 
viewpoints to be considered, rather than to falsify one of a 
set of scientific theories. In the former, the enemy is 
incompleteness of the system functions or attributes, 
rather than the identification of inconsistency in a 
formalised system of scientific theory.  
The mechanism would also need to emphasise the 
nature and quality of the choices made available to 
decision-makers, with the intention of informing them in 
their decision-making processes. Some technical system 
design decisions may need to remain with the software 
developers, but the dialectical mechanisms would need to 
inform decision-makers about how and why these 
decisions were made. 
By whatever means it is to be achieved, the placing of 
two or more models in opposition to each other also 
requires that those aspects which need to be compared 
between models are capable of being compared 
meaningfully; that is, these aspects need to be 
commensurable (cf. Kuhn 1970). This requirement may 
place a limit on the diversity of the ISs to be employed in 
areas where comparisons need to be made, or to an 
expectation that models may require some reworking or 
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 explanation in order to make the relevant aspects of each 
model commensurable. 
 Future Developments 
The directions in which this line of research will take 
us are not yet clear. However, some work is already under 
way, viz. the extension of the philosophical analysis 
described here, and the design of an investigation to apply 
these ideas in a practical environment to test their validity 
and usefulness. The long-term goal of this work is to 
devise an improved philosophical basis for software 
development mechanisms in general. We also hope that, 
as our understanding of this basis grows, it will be 
possible to make concrete suggestions as to how the 
practice of current software development can be 
improved. 
Practical Applications of a Dialectically-Based 
Inquiry System 
What we have presented above is a hypothesis, based 
on observation of the current state of software system 
development. Practical investigations are needed to 
determine whether the hypothesis can be supported in 
practice, and to inform practitioners of any positive 
conclusions which can be drawn at this stage. The long-
term objective of this research programme is neither to 
develop a ‘super-methodology’ with the intention of 
selling it as the solution to all problems in software 
development, nor to validate the use of any particular tool 
or set of tools used in combination. Instead, the aim is to 
determine the success or otherwise of the philosophical 
research direction, viz. to see whether, and if so how well, 
the underlying dialectic-based mechanism works. 
One possible programme of practical research would 
start with the selection of a set of appropriate ISs and of 
an existing approach based on each, to save the need to 
develop new methods and test them individually before 
starting the research. For example, it may be possible to 
present, for comparison by stakeholders, models of 
current situations or proposed software-based systems 
developed using SSM with its Churchman-based IS, and 
high-level systems models developed using a hard method 
such as UML (Rational 2000) or SSADM (Downs et al. 
1992) with their Leibnitzian basis. Given the current state 
of software development, it may be advantageous at 
present to employ at least one Leibnitzian method or tool-
set, in order to reflect the computational models 
underlying software implementation mechanisms and thus 
make implementation of the finally-selected model easier.  
The selected approaches would then be incorporated 
into a single project plan. Models developed using the 
different ISs would be placed before a group of 
stakeholders, to allow them to make comparisons and to 
devise a unified model. Guidance to the stakeholders on 
how to perform this comparison, and support during the 
process, would almost certainly be required. 
An analysis of the lessons to be learned from this 
process would need to consider how well the different 
standpoints adopted and models created work together in 
bringing to the surface the assumptions implicit in the 
situation, in each approach and in the system functions 
identified by each approach. The ways in which the 
comparisons were performed and their degree of success 
would also need to examined and improved, to inform 
further investigations. The outputs of the synthesis of the 
models created could also be compared with the outputs 
of each approach taken individually. The results of this 
analysis would be fed into succeeding practical research 
exercises, possibly employing different sets of ISs. 
Furthering the Philosophical Examination 
The thinking behind the examination of the current 
state of software development and its potential for 
improvement by application of mechanisms based on 
Hegel’s work may lead us to the examination of other 
related philosophical questions. Currently open questions 
include how to select the Inquiry Systems underlying a 
software development method, and how to bring models 
developed using those ISs into contention.  
Looking from a wider perspective, how might the ISs 
selected interact with other elements of the Kuhnian 
disciplinary matrices (Wernick 1996; Wernick and 
Winder 1997) on which the method, and each of the tools 
comprising it, is based? We suggest initially that the ISs 
adopted will interact, for example, with the computational 
models underlying the notations to be used for model-
building, to produce a more or less ‘hard’ approach, and 
that these in combination will in turn affect the degree of 
‘hardness’ of the final system. The effect of this choice on 
other possible elements of the disciplinary matrix and how 
influential they are in determining the mind-set which they 
project on to their users, is a question for future 
investigation. 
Summary 
We have observed that the mechanisms currently in 
use for the analysis of human activity systems, and the 
devising of software-based tools intended to improve the 
working of those systems, are each based on the use of a 
single Inquiry System at any one stage. We suggest that 
such an approach might fail to capture a sufficiently wide 
range of relevant information about the situation to enable 
a long-lasting software-based system to be developed and 
installed, and may also embed assumptions in the software 
itself which might cause problems later in the life of the 
system. We therefore conclude that the feasibility of 
approaches incorporating more than one IS at the same 
time should be examined, and the results of such studies 
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 compared with those obtained from using current 
mechanisms. 
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